cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/12409256

The UK Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee issued two reports last week: “China and the UK economy: the case for risk-managed growth” (“China Report” - opens pdf) on 2 November 2026, and “Critical minerals” (“Critical Minerals Report” - opens pdf) on 5 November 2026.

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The China Report finds that the UK Government has not delivered on its 2024 promise of a strategic, long-term, consistent approach to China, and that its record of decision making has been characterised by “reactivity, inconsistency, and opacity”.

The China Report recommends, amongst other things:

• A “traffic light” risk framework of red (off limits), amber (permitted subject to risk mitigations) and green (permitted) zones for economic engagement with China;

• That the UK Government insist on fair trade, the strengthening of trade remedies and reform of procurement to enable British firms to compete on a level playing field. It should prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies and data to China by better resourcing the UK’s research security apparatus, banning high risk connected tech from UK critical national infrastructure and strengthening the regulation of data traffic between connected vehicles in the UK and foreign entities;

• Updating the NSIA to give ongoing oversight of foreign ownership of, or control over, strategic entities and assets, including a power to review ownership where material circumstances (including the national security situation) change;

• Amending section 54 NSIA so that the Government can share more information on screening decisions with Parliament. The Government has resisted similar calls since the inception of the regime on the basis that Parliament’s role in scrutinising individual case is exceptional rather than routine.

The Critical Minerals Report inds that the UK “is now dangerously dependent on supply chains that are dominated by China” and calls for the UK Government to “precision de-risk” UK critical mineral supply chains.

The Critical Minerals Report’s recommendations most relevant to dealmakers are:

• Create a Critical Minerals Finance Facility, bringing together the UK’s public finance institutions (including domestic, export and overseas development finance bodies) to finance strategic projects through equity, loans, long-term offtake agreements and price floors – mechanisms already being deployed by other governments. Individual UK finance bodies have previously supported UK critical mineral sources including tungsten (Tungsten West, 2026), tin (Cornish Metals, 2025 and 2026) and lithium (Cornish Lithium, 2023). Direct state investment is not proposed (although the UK Government has procured offtake rights in relation to some projects financed by UK finance bodies) and has not been a condition of NSIA clearances to date (and would be a radical step).

• Establish “buyers” clubs with G7, EU and other allies to aggregate demand, jointly finance projects (for example, sharing the costs of new mines and smelters – a single US rare earth magnet facility required USD 1.25 billion of investment) and to secure offtake.

• Publish lists of desired “sovereign capabilities”, critical mineral dependencies and minerals to be sourced domestically. These would crystallise economic security sensitivities and inform NSIA review of deals touching those areas. The Critical Minerals Report also recommends mapping UK workforce / skills requirements, which can be an area of focus for NSIA remedies.

• Introduce procurement preference for firms sourcing from domestic and allied sources, with large-contract suppliers required to reduce exposure to high-risk jurisdictions, making supply chain origin a value driver in diligence (with echoes of the EU’s “European preference” strategy, discussed in our client memo). The US, for example, has offered tax credits to firms sourcing minerals domestically or from partners.

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The UK Government is under no obligation to act on the committee’s recommendations but aims to respond within two months. With continued pressure from China, the two Reports will likely receive close attention. The Government did not accept any NSIA reform recommendations made by a 2025 report on economic security (discussed in our client memo).

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